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Abstract This paper examines the dynamic process of quality adjustment in cases
where the economy lacks a sufficient number of markets for coordinating the level
of attributes that configure the qualities of products. It shows that an adjustment pro-
cess through the development and selection of commodities with different qualities
may succeed in achieving efficiency or at least, meet the necessary conditions for
efficiency. This is true if the user can identify with the altered product and is unaf-
fected by variety in the commodity. It also holds true when the consumer assesses
product variety in a smooth (differentiable) function, but not necessarily so if the as-
sessment is non-smooth regarding the homogeneous state. An unidentifiable case can
also be subject to inefficiency as the effort of a small quality adjusting agent becomes
attenuated.
Keywords Quality adjustment · Adaptive selection · Trial and error · Variety
averse · Non-spanning markets
JEL Classification L15 · H23 · O33
1 Introduction
Many transactions in a product supply chain involve quality coordinations among
vertically differentiated intermediate commodities. For example, manufacturers of
turbine engines are selective about the performance of turbine blades, whereas pro-
ducers of the blades focus on cost effectiveness that is better quality blades at lower
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costs. Similarly, the recycling industry will be affected by the recyclability of the
secondary (recycled) inputs, which is controlled by the producers of primary prod-
ucts. The quality adjustment process described hereinafter is therefore somewhat in
the same vein as the demand-driven technology evolution, as discussed in Adner and
Levinthal (2001).
Based on the Lancasterian consumer theory (Lancaster 1966), quality is usually
treated as the bundle of objective characteristics (attributes) of a commodity for which
the consumer holds positive values.1 This paper is concerned with commodities that
are vertically differentiated by objective quality: In other words, better quality is pre-
ferred by all users (consumers) if the commodities are sold at the same price. For
example, PCs with a fast processor and a relatively slow processor are vertically dif-
ferentiated, whereas chocolate and vanilla ice cream are horizontally differentiated
because they are equally priced.2
Quality can be subject to externalities when product attributes lack their individual
markets. Attributes generally do not retain the excludability property that a normal
commodity has in theory due to their bundledness, rendering the independent coor-
dination of attributes impractical. While excludability being one of the characteristic
of a public good, Leland (1977) and Dreze and Hagen (1978) indicate that for qual-
ity choices, individuals’ private assessment (i.e., the Lindahl price) of attributes are
needed when the implicit market of attributes is incomplete. Conversely, these studies
claim that if every attribute’s implicit price spans the explicit competitive prices of
goods, the (first-order) conditions for efficiency are met.
This study focuses on cases in which the market of attributes forms an incom-
plete, non-spanning structure, and thus quality is partially or completely external to
the economic coordination system. Given these circumstances, the study posits that
producers follow a quality adjustment process based on trial-and-error, that is, they
adjust the quality in accordance with demand in order to predominate the product
market with improved quality. The idea is parallel to previous studies on dynamic
search processes, such as Callander (2011) under conditions of uncertainty and Sato
(2012) for public goods. Nevertheless, it was Jwa (1985) who studied quality de-
velopment in vertically differentiated products, assuming the price of quality being
available.
Jwa (1985) also pointed out the reduction in variety by the nature of competitive
equilibrium, resulting in a single homogeneous quality across products. Similar issues
have been addressed in Nishimura (2008) about the quality of secondary materials in
the recycling industry. More recently, from a slightly different perspectives, Brun and
Pero (2012) analyzed a firm’s decision to reduce its variety of industrial products.
Such a reduction in the vertically differentiated variety is essentially equivalent to
being variety averse, discussed in a number of empirical studies (e.g., Levav et al.
1A characteristics approach has been extensively applied in the marketing and innovation metrics liter-
ature, using methods ranging from hedonic functions (i.e., Rosen 1974) to discrete choice models (i.e.,
McFadden 1986).
2Horizontal product differentiation and the related models based on Hotelling (1929) have been widely
discussed in industrial organizations literature (e.g., Economides 1984; Shaked and Sutton 1987, etc.).
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2010; Kaiser 2011). The essential problem is that products need differentiation to
enable the selection of a better quality product, while it is refused to diversify after
one being selected.3
In this paper, a model of quality adjusting process under non-spanning structure
of implicit markets over the attributes is presented. Change in quality is controlled
by the assumption that a competitive producer not only maximizes profit by taking
the price of product, but also alters the quality (or that of the attributes) with the
speculation that a product with a different quality (and corresponding price) can lead
the market. The benchmark model deals with cases in which the buyer of a product
is indifferent to the heterogeneity in product quality. The buyer chooses the quality
altered product if the product with marginally altered quality is more valuable to him
or her relative to the marginal cost of altering the quality, which the seller adds to
the price of the product.4 The new product will then dominate the market, thereby
improving the quality in the market.
The steady state of the benchmark process is shown to satisfy the necessary con-
ditions of efficiency. However, this is not the case when heterogeneity in product
quality matters to the buyer. For example, intermediate and recycling industries typ-
ically use bulky inputs for production, and thus consistent quality is often preferred.
However, if the producer of an upper stream industry alternates the quality of its prod-
uct, the lower stream industry would consequently face heterogeneous inputs. This
study presents several cases of buyers’ preference for homogeneous/heterogeneous
quality. It shows that even when products with varied quality are differently priced,
the quality adjustment procedure may not function when the variety assessment of
the buyer is non-smooth around the center. Cases where heterogeneous products are
assessed with a flat price could lead to inefficiency because the smaller the producer,
the more its effort become attenuated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly specifies the span-
ning property in the implicit markets for attributes, and by doing so, focus on the
equilibrium state of a non-spanning economy where some attributes are external to
the economy. Section 3 outlines the foundations of the quality adjustment process
driven by one of producers (a speculator) seeking alternating price-quality combina-
tions in a non-spanning environment. Subsequently, the case of a consumer without
distastes upon heterogeneous products is discussed. In Sect. 4, we consider cases
where the consumer is variety averse, that is, the consumer/user prefers consistent
product quality. Section 5 is devoted to demonstrating the results with a simple model
of a recycling economy. Section 6 concludes.
3This contention is also addressed in bioevolution literature such as Batten and Boschetti (2008). Hosoda
(2012) deliberately uses the linear joint production models instead.
4It is assumed that a producer may not observe the buyer’s reservation price of quality, but may know its
relativity with the asked price by observing the buyer’s decision.
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2 Market Structure
2.1 Spanning Economy
We begin with a simple general equilibrium model of a Lancasterian economy that
incorporates the essential features needed for the subsequent discussions. We use
the term “commodities” to designate goods and services subject to actual market
transactions. There are N types of commodities, indexed j = 1, . . . ,N and Z types
of attributes indexed i = 1, . . . ,Z. The quantity of j commodity is represented by
xj , while the whole set of commodities is represented by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xN).
Similarly, the amount of i attributes within the whole economy is represented by si
and the set of attributes is represented by s = (s1, . . . , sZ). aij denotes the amount
of attributes i per unit of commodity j , hence si = ∑j xj aij by definition and A
denotes the N × Z matrix with the typical entry being aij . Therefore, the quality
of commodity j can be represented by a vector of the quantity of attributes aj =
(a1j , . . . , aZj ).
We assume a representative consumer with utility function U(s) that maps from
a given bundle of attributes s to a real number. Also, let B denote the budget for
the representative consumer and p = (p1, . . . , pN) the price vector for commodities,
where pj designates the price of the j commodity. We specify the representative
consumer’s behavior as follows:
max
s,x
U(s) s.t. B = xp′, s= xA. (1)
Ordinal assumptions for the utility function must be applied, that is, U is strictly
quasi-concave and at least twice continuously differentiable with respect to all entries.
The first-order conditions for this optimization follow below:
UsA′ = λp (2)
where the scalar λ designates the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint.









and so forth to save space.
The firms are characterized by the transformation functions that maps from x into
s, that is, G(x) = (G1(x), . . . ,GZ(x)) = (s1, . . . , sZ) = s, and the production pos-
sibility set for the attributes s, namely, F(s) = 0. An implicit transformation func-
tion of the commodities can be constructed using these terms, that is, F(G(x)) = 0.
A marginal firm will seek to earn profits under the transformation function:5
max
x,s
xp′ s.t. F(s) = 0, s=G(x). (3)
5The earned profits will be transferred to the representative consumer’s budget B , and thus we have the
closed system.
Journal of Economic Structures (2013) 2:6 Page 5 of 18
The first-order conditions for this behavior is described below:
μFsG′x = −p (4)
where the scalar μ designates the Lagrangean multiplier for the transformation func-










At the efficient state of this simple Lancasterian economy it must be true that the
representative consumer’s marginal rate of substitution is tangent to the marginal rate
of transformation with respect to all existing attributes. This is the familiar first-order





= · · · = UsZ
FsZ
. (5)
On the other hand, by Eqs. (2) and (4), we have the following conditions for the
commodities market equilibrium:
−λμFsG′x = UsA′.
As it is evident from these equations, we need Gx = A and a right inverse matrix
to exist, to assure that the commodities market equilibrium will reach a state of effi-
ciency; however, this would be possible only if N ≥ Z and the matrix is non-singular.
These conditions are otherwise called the spanning property (Leland 1977) of the im-
plicit market for attributes.
2.2 Model of Non-spanning
Based on the above argument, we introduce a model for non-spanning in a most
simplistic manner. In the model, there are only two commodities in the economy,
one of which is identified by its first attribute, quantity, denoted by x, and its second
attribute, quality, denoted by s. The second commodity is a numeraire good identified
by its amount y, while this being its only attribute. The equilibrium price of the
first commodity is p, whereas that of the numeraire is kept as unity. Below is the






















s.t. F(x, s, y) = 0, s = G(x,y). (7)
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The first-order conditions for (6) and (7) together will be reduced:
−λμ (Fx Fs Fy)
⎛
⎝ 1 0Gx Gy
0 1
⎞






The non-spanning property of G′x and A′ is obvious, while 0 = Gy and a = Gx are
justified since s = ax = G(x,y). Hence, we hereby rewrite the given structure (8)
accordingly in a different fashion:
Uy
Fy
= Ux + aUs
Fx + aFs = −λμ ≡ θ. (9)




= Fx + aFs
Fy
= p. (10)
These terms are however insufficient with respect to the first-order conditions for
economic efficiency. Non-spanning is indeed the case when the economy fails to
coordinate multiple items with a single price.
3 Quality Adjustment Process
Based on the above argument, we introduce a behavioral model of the producer who
jointly produces quality. First, consider the gap between the WTP (willingness-to-
pay), φ, and the marginal cost, ω, which is essentially zero at an equilibrium.
Ux + aUs
Uy




1. There is a producer called speculator in the member of the industry who chal-
lenges the commodity market by altering the quality of the commodity being pro-
duced.
2. The speculator will challenge the commodity market, not only with the quality, but
also with the price that equals the marginal cost of the quality altered commodity.6
3. The consumers observe the quality and price of the speculator’s commodity and
decide if it is advantageous for them, and whether to alter their consumption by
purchasing the quality altered commodity.
6The speculator is not a monopolist with the market power to dictate the price over the marginal cost; it is
rather a marginal producer under competition as regards Assumption 5.
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Fig. 1 Marginal price of quality
and the willingness to pay
4. The consumers are variety neutral, that is, their assessment is only of the specula-
tor’s commodity and unaffected by other commodities.
5. If the new quality altered commodity is accepted, all the other firms will follow
the speculator, and the market will again have homogeneous quality and price. If
not, quality and price will remain unchanged.
Under the above assumptions, it is possible to infer the marginal price-quality
assessments between supply and demand by observing the consequences of the con-
sumer’s accept or refuse decision without knowing the actual curvatures of φ and ω,
which cannot be observed.
As regards the market of commodity, the WTP, φ, and the WTA (willingness-to-
accept), which according to Assumption 2, equals the marginal cost, ω, must always
meet at an equilibrium, for any given quality. In addition, the commodity’s marginal
WTP with respect to quality, φs , and the commodity’s marginal WTA with respect
to quality, ωs , should also meet at an equilibrium, according to the above mentioned
assumptions. That is, if the speculator’s challenge, Δs, conduces the commodity’s
WTP to exceed WTA, then the challenge will be approved; if not, the challenge will
be disapproved. Illustrated in Fig. 1 is the typical situation, and according to which
we may conjecture the following equivalences:{
Δs > 0 is accepted ⇔ φs − ωs > 0,
Δs < 0 is accepted ⇔ φs − ωs < 0. (12)
With respect to (12), quality adjustment can be expressed as the following dif-
ferential equation, with k > 0 being a velocity coefficient small enough to prevent
overshooting:
φs − ωs = k d s
d t
= ks˙.
At the stationary state s˙ = 0, we have what follows with respect to (11):
Uxs + aUss − pUys
Uy
− Fxs + aFss − pFys
Fy
= 0. (13)
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As shown in the Appendix, from the above condition (13) and (9) taken into account,
we arrive at the following first-order conditions for economic efficiency, which is









In this section, we consider the case in which the variety of commodity with respect
to its quality matters to the consumer. In other words, we relax Assumption 4 of the
basic model, and assume that consumers will be affected by not only the speculator’s
commodity, but also the remaining commodities. We denote the quality of the specu-
lator’s commodity by σ and the consumer’s WTP for the corresponding commodity
by ϕ. The following quality adjustment process for the speculator is considered:
ϕσ − ωσ = kσ˙ . (15)
In this regard, we take s = σ on the supply side for granted, with a speculator being
one of many producing firms with identical technology. We therefore stay with ω to
denote the marginal cost of producing commodities, and consequently perceive that
ωσ = ωs ; however, the willingness to pay φ is not same.
Since we assume that the speculator’s commodity is differentiable (by its quality)
from others, a consumer should have a varying willingness to pay upon the differen-
tiated commodities. In that respect, the quality of the varied commodities, from the
perspective of a variety conscious consumer, will be affected by the quality of the
speculator’s commodity as well as those of the other producers and the quantity of
the varied commodities. What follows is how the consumer evaluates in effect the
quality of the speculator’s commodity:7
s = σ + ηV (σ, ξ, s¯, x¯). (16)
The variety assessment function V measures the variety of the commodities in terms
of the entries, namely, the speculator’s commodity σ , the quantity share of the spec-
ulator ξ , the quality of the remaining commodity s¯, and the quantity share of the
remaining commodity x¯. Notice that x = ξ + x¯ by definition. The consistence pref-
erence is accounted for by η where a negative value designates variety averseness.
The consumer’s evaluation of the speculator’s commodity therefore accounts for the
quality of the corresponding commodity as well as the variety effect, as shown above.
In the following sections, we investigate how the consistency preference consid-
ered in (16) could affect the quality adjustment process specified in (15). In doing so,
7In this regard, we are implicitly assuming that a consumer evaluates quality differentiated commodities
within the mixture of the commodities. For example, a firm’s evaluation of an English peaking worker,
with respect to the firm’s productivity, will likely depend on the remaining workers’ speaking language.
Similar features can also be found in the bulky transactions of intermediate commodities.
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we assume for simplicity’s sake that U(x, s, y) = U(x, s) + y so that φ in (11) will
be reduced simply to
Ux + aUs = φ. (17)
4.1 Smooth Variety Assessment Function
We first study the case in which the variety assessment function V takes the form of
variance i.e.,
V (σ, ξ, s¯, x¯) =
(




ξ + x¯ +
(




ξ + x¯ . (18)
This is a smooth (quadratic) function, that is, the function is differentiable with re-
spect to all variables including σ .
Let us calculate some of the derivatives beforehand:
Vξ = (σ − s¯)
2(x¯ − ξ)x¯
(x¯ + ξ)3 , Vσ =
2(σ − s¯)ξ x¯
(x¯ + ξ)2 .
We therefore have the following property for this smooth variety function at the ho-
mogeneous state, where σ = s¯:
V (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = Vξ (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = Vσ (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = 0. (19)
Now investigate the demand schedule for the speculator’s commodity ϕ along with
the simplification on the utility function made earlier in (17), such that ϕ = Uξ +aUσ
by definition. In the light of (16), what follows is evident:
ϕ = Uξ + aUσ = Ux + ηVξUs + (1+ ηVσ )aUs.
According to (18), a smooth function such as (19) reduces to the following in the
neighborhood of the homogeneous state:
ϕ = Ux + aUs = φ.
Moreover, we may further differentiate to obtain the following:
ϕσ = (Uxs + aUss)(1+ ηVσ ) = φs(1+ ηVσ ) = φs.
Note that the last identity owes to (19). As shown below, we note that the dynamic
characteristics of the quality adjustment process (15) in the neighborhood of the ho-
mogeneous state is essentially identical to the variety neutral case (12), which has
been previously shown to satisfactorily meet first-order conditions for economic effi-
ciency.
kσ˙ = ϕσ − ωσ = φs − ωs.
In other words, adjustment process based on trial and error with variety averse utility
and a smooth assessment of variety can be considered as approximately equivalent to
the variety neutral case (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2 Willingness to pay with
smooth variety averseness
4.2 Nonsmooth Variety Assessment Function
Now, we suppose the variety assessment function takes the form of a standard devia-
tion i.e.,
V (σ, ξ, s¯, x¯) =
√(




ξ + x¯ +
(




ξ + x¯ .
In this case, the derivatives are also calculated,
Vξ = (x¯ − ξ)(σ − s¯)
2ξ(x¯ + ξ)2
√
ξ x¯, Vσ =
√
ξ x¯
x¯ + ξ , (20)
while the property in a homogeneous state proves to be slightly different:
V (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = Vξ (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = 0, Vσ (s¯, ξ, s¯, x¯) = 0. (21)





x¯ + ξ = 0, Vσσ = 0. (22)
Hence, in the neighborhood of the homogeneous state, we have
ϕσ = Uxs(1+ ηVσ ) + aUss(1+ ηVσ )2 = φs (23)
according to (21) and (22).
With respect to (23) concerns about the adjustment process might be raised. Note
that ϕσ can be larger than φs when σ approaches s¯ from below (left) according to
(22), because η is negative for a variety averse consumer. At the same time, ϕσ be-
comes smaller and even negative when σ approaches from above (right) for the very
same reason. In such cases, the adjustment process will stop at a homogeneous and
possibly inefficient state, despite the speculator’s continuous exploration of different
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Fig. 3 Willingness to pay with
non-smooth variety averseness
qualities. Such a situation is described below and also illustrated in Fig. 3. The case
is further demonstrated using a simple general equilibrium model of recycling in the
next section.
φs − ωs < ϕσ − ωσ = kσ˙ > 0 (σ < s¯)
φs − ωs > ϕσ − ωσ = kσ˙ < 0 (σ > s¯)
}
⇒ kσ˙ = 0 (σ = s¯).
4.3 Unidentifiable Case
Thus far, we have assumed that the speculator’s commodity is at least differentiable
from others. We now relax this assumption. Since we assume the speculator’s com-
modity is unidentifiable to the consumer, the consumer’s assessment of quality will
not be of the producer’s particular product, but rather of the blended bulk of all the
products. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the assessment of quality is rep-
resented by the quantity-weighted quality and the magnitude of variety is ignored:
s = σξ + s¯x¯









Notice that 1/n designates the fraction of the speculator’s market share.
The willingness to pay for the undifferentiable products (in this case, we write
it as φ because the commodities are homogenized) is as defined in (17) because the
quality assessment is s. But when the construction of s is what is as described in (24),
the differential upon φ will be affected:
φσ = 1
n
(Uxs + aUss) = 1
n
φs. (25)
We illustrate the possible status in Fig. 4. As the share of the speculator becomes
insignificant, that is, as 1/n gets smaller, φσ gets smaller if not negative. In this
regard, the speculator may alter the quality of the product σ in the opposite direc-
tion, and the quality s will eventually settle at a state that is inefficient, such that
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Fig. 4 Non-identifiable case
Fig. 5 Recycling economy
1
n
φs = ωσ . Finally, we note that the variety averse issues discussed in the earlier sec-
tions can also arise in the unidentifiable case, although we do not further delve into
this matter.
5 Example: Recycling Economy
5.1 Brief Description of the Model
The core elements of the model are adopted from Nishimura (2008). All notations
on variables are therefore subject to the original paper. There are three agents in the
recycling market: the producer, consumer, and recycler (Fig. 5). The producer jointly
produces the final commodity of amount x, and its quality (recyclability) whose quan-
tified amount is s, by using inputs, the secondary material of amount y, and the labor
of amount l. For simulation purposes, we study the following production functions:
x = yαl1−α, s = y−αlα. (26)
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The recycler produces the secondary material of amount y by using inputs, namely
the waste that comes from the consumer, whose amount coincides with that of the
primary production x, and the labor amount m. We use the following example as the
recycler’s production function:
y = xβm1−βs. (27)
The market is evaluated by the consumer’s utility, whose utility is simply ruled by the
consumer’s quantity of consumption of the commodity, which is measured by x. The
model is closed by giving the labor resource constraint that amounts to Q, such that
l + m ≤ Q.
Given the market prices, we describe the behavior of each agent. The market price
for the commodity, the secondary material, and the labor be denoted ω, ρ, and δ,
respectively. The recycler’s willingness to pay is denoted by φ. No price will be levied
on the recyclability due to the underlying non-spanning assumption. The producer’s
problem is therefore to solve
max
x,y,l
ωx − ρy − δl s.t. (26)
for which we have the following first-order condition:
ω = ρs1−α + δs. (28)
In the same vein, the recycler’s problem is to solve
max
x,y,m
ρy − φx − δm s.t. (27)
and the first-order condition follows:
φ = s/ββ(1− β)(1−β)/βδ(β−1)/βρ1/β . (29)
Due to the nature of the consumer’s utility, ω = φ must hold at the equilibrium
for any given s. In this case, we may solve for ρ with respect to (28) and (29). The
solution can be written ρ(s) to indicate that ρ is subject to s. Now the ceteris paribus
price of the commodity with respect to its recyclability s, with other things (including
ρ) being equal, becomes
ω(s; s¯) = ρ(s¯)s1−α + δs (30)
where s¯ is the underlying recyclability employed by the remaining producers. In a
similar manner, the ceteris paribus willingness to pay of the recycler to pay for the
wastes with respect to the recyclability s of the corresponding commodity, with other
things being equal, follows below:
φ(s; s¯) = s/ββ(1− β)(1−β)/βδ(β−1)/β(ρ(s¯))1/β .
The equilibrium net price of homogeneous commodity with respect to its recyclability
is denoted by π(s), while by definition, we note that
π(s) = ω(s; s) − φ(s; s).
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Table 1 Parameters in simulation cases
α β  δ Q s∗ η ν n
Case 1 0.5 0.2 0.3 5 20 1.2 0 – –
Case 2 −10 1 100
Case 3 −0.2 0.5 100
5.2 Speculator and Variety Averseness
Now introduce the speculator designated in Sect. 3. The speculator’s recyclability is
denoted by σ . As the speculator is one of many with identical production technology,
the commodity price of the speculator will be those specified in (30), except the
recyclability is of the speculator:
ω(σ ; s¯) = ρ(s¯)σ 1−α + δσ.
On the other hand, the recycler’s willingness to pay for the speculator’s identifiable
commodity/waste will depend on the recycler’s assessment of its recyclability, that is,
ϕ(σ ; s¯) = (s(σ, s¯))/ββ(1− β)(1−β)/βδ(β−1)/β(ρ(s¯))1/β .
The recycler’s assessment of recyclability s(σ, s¯) depends on the variety aversion η
and the measure of variability:
s(σ, s¯) = σ + η
((




ξ + x¯ +
(






where ν characterizes the form of variety assessment function such as variance
(ν = 1) and standard deviation (ν = 0.5). Notice that ξ and x¯ are the quantitative
share of the speculator and the rest of the producers, respectively. The quality (recy-
clability) adjustment process in this case can be described as the net price-minimizing
behavior of the speculator. The process described below will find at least a local min-
imum.
−(ωσ − ϕσ ) = kσ˙ , k > 0.
Note that this process is essentially identical to the previous function (15).
We examine the corresponding dynamic process using pro forma numbers shown
in Table 1. Figures 6, 7, 8, illustrate the mutatis mutandis (as opposite to ceteris
paribus) net price π(s) for the indicated interval of s. The s that minimizes π(s) is
denoted s∗ and the value is shown in the table. In all simulation cases, the underlying
recyclability is the same, that is, s¯ = 1.1. Case 1 represents the variety neutral case,
in which the recycler’s assessment of speculator’s commodity/waste is unaffected by
those of the remaining producers such that s(σ ; s¯) = σ . We can conclude from Fig. 6
that in the neighborhood of s¯ the descent direction of the ceteris paribus net price
ω − ϕ is oriented toward the desired s∗.
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Fig. 6 Speculator’s ceteris paribus net price at s¯ = 1.1, in case 1
Fig. 7 Speculator’s ceteris paribus net price at s¯ = 1.1, in case 2
Figure 7 illustrates case 2 when the recycler is variety averse (η < 0), while the
recycler’s variety assessment is with a smooth function (ν = 1). As illustrated, the
descent direction of the ceteris paribus net price is the same as that of the mutatis
mutandis net price π which is destined to s∗, in the neighborhood of s¯. It can also
be noted that this is true for any η < 0, provided the variety assessment function is
smooth (ν = 1). The non-smooth case, ν = 0.5, is illustrated in Fig. 8. The descent
direction of the ceteris paribus net price in this case is oriented not toward s∗ but
toward s¯, indicating that the recyclability adjusting process will fail to achieve the
socially preferred state.
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Fig. 8 Speculator’s ceteris paribus net price at s¯ = 1.1, in case 3
6 Concluding Remarks
The Japanese saying “the pile that sticks out gets hammered down,” essentially means
that a person who stands out too much is subject to reprisal (or assimilation). In our
model, we found that a producer seeking the opportunity to ameliorate its product
can face reprisal due to the non-smooth variety aversion of the consumer. At the
same time, we also found that this is not the case if the variety assessment is with a
smooth function and the speculator’s strategy will lead to a state of efficiency.
The quality adjustment of producers based on trial and error discussed in this paper
can be relevant when the economy lacks a sufficient number of commodity markets
for all the attributes (and therefore quality) to be coordinated indirectly. Such a non-
spanning structure can be typical in the markets of intermediate commodities with
many inseparable attributes. Contrasted with final products purchased by end con-
sumers with different tastes and a preference for variety, the market for intermediate
commodities tends to contract as inputs of different quality are often perfect substi-
tutes in production.
Producers, perhaps through research and development, change the quality of their
product in pursuit of prosperity on the basis of trial and error. A consumer’s im-
plicit valuation of the attributes are learned by the speculator and, eventually, by all
providers through the consistent quality-price movement of the commodity. The im-
plicit value of attributes, although not quite as efficient as the Lindahl price, is the
necessary information for achieving economic efficiency. A quality adjusting pro-
ducer and a variety averse consumer are perhaps the ones that are hammering out the
technological structures of the economy.
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Appendix
By re-arranging (13), we have
Uxs + aUss − pUys




where the last identity holds for the sake of (9). Hence, should there be some δ = 0
such that
Uxs + aUss − pUys + δUy = Fxs + aFss − pFys + δFy = 0
so that we may apply l’Hôspital’s rule with respect to p in the following formula to
obtain the first identity below. The remaining identities are due to (31).
Uxs + aUss − pUys + δUy






Meanwhile, we may find ε = 0 such that
U(x,y, s) − ε = θ(F(x, y, s) − ε), (33)
so that for some γ = 0, we have
U(x,y, s) − ε + γUy = F(x, y, s) − ε + γFy = 0.
This enables l’Hôspital’s rule again, but this time with respect to s, thus obtaining
U(x,y, s) − ε + γUy
F(x, y, s) − ε + γFy =
Us + γUys




where the last identity holds because of (32). Finally, (34), (13), and (9) gives the
wanted result (14).
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